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ABSTRACT: Consider two features of Hermann Cohen’s critical philosophy. First, using what 
Cohen calls the transcendental method, critical philosophy aims to identify formal conditions of 
experience that are universally, and so timelessly, valid. Second, detailed, context-sensitive 
surveys of the history of science and philosophy are ubiquitous in his accounts of those formal 
conditions. This paper argues for two claims about how those two features of Cohen’s 
philosophy fit together. First, Cohen holds the striking view that, while philosophy aims to 
discover and investigate principles that are timelessly valid, it must nevertheless use historical 
investigation to do so. Second, Cohen has the resources to explain why, on his view, history must 
play this role in philosophy. This paper uses a genealogical strategy to locate that explanation in 
Cohen’s writings: it traces views of history held by various of Cohen’s teachers, and shows that 
Cohen combines and develops those ideas to produce just the explanation needed. Ultimately, 
the underlying reasoning of Cohen’s explanation is this. The history of science has a teleological 
structure, and as it unfolds knowledge becomes increasingly universal. But then, elements of 
scientific theories that remain stable across a succession of increasingly universal theories will be 
plausible candidates for or approximations of the strictly universal formal conditions of 
experience. The critical philosopher is thus required to attend to the history of science to identify 
plausible candidates for those formal conditions. 
 
1 I am grateful to Michael Heidelberger and Katherina Kinzel for the conversations that prompted me to write this 
paper. I am also very grateful to Dai Heide, Lydia Patton, and an anonymous referee for this journal, all of whom 




§1. The role of history in Cohen’s account of philosophical method 
Boris Pasternak, in his charming account of the time he spent studying philosophy in 
Marburg, recounts his excitement about the prospect of studying specifically with Hermann 
Cohen:   
At Marburg they gazed at history through both of Hegel’s eyes, i.e., with brilliant 
universality, but at the same time with the exact boundaries of a judicious verisimilitude. 
So for instance, the school did not speak of the stages in the development of the 
“Weltgeist,” but, say, of the postal correspondence of the Bernoulli family... (Pasternak 
1958 [1931]: 42) 
Pasternak is pointing, quite insightfully, to two of the most central features of Cohen’s theory of 
knowledge and philosophy of science: his twin concerns with what is universal in knowledge and 
with knowledge’s origins and development in history.  
 Commentators on Cohen have tended to emphasize one or the other of those concerns. 
There are thus interpretations of Cohen that foreground his view that knowledge is grounded and 
made objective by principles that are universally, and so timelessly, valid. These interpretations 
emphasize Cohen’s insistence that those principles are “transcendental” in a sense that means 
their validity is independent of the contingent historical circumstances of their discovery or 
expression. In Cohen’s mature writing on knowledge, he claims that these principles have a 
“purity” that means their origin cannot be in some contingent historical-developmental process 
that stands outside of thought.2 In contrast, there are interpretations of Cohen that foreground the 
role that history plays in his own writings. These interpretations emphasize the close attention he 
 
2 See, for example, Holzhey’s account of Cohen’s concepts of “origin” and “purity (Holzhey 1986, vol. 1: 175-8) 
and Poma’s account of the concept of purity in Cohen’s logic (Poma 1997: 80-83), as well as Beiser’s discussion of 




pays to how the expression of concepts, principles, and laws develops through the history of 
science, morality, and culture more generally.3 
 The differences between these two camps in the Cohen literature are best understood as 
differences in emphasis: the first camp acknowledges Cohen’s interest in history, and the second 
camp allows that Cohen aims to identify principles that are universally valid. But for the most 
part, these commentators do not explicitly raise the question of whether these two strains in 
Cohen’s philosophy fit together perfectly comfortably, or whether on the contrary there is work 
to be done to explain how they do in fact fit together.4  
 I want to raise just those questions, and I want to answer them with two principal claims. 
First, Cohen holds that, while philosophy aims to discover and investigate objects of knowledge 
that are timelessly valid, it must nevertheless use historical investigation to do so. Second, Cohen 
has the resources to explain why, on his view, history must play that role in philosophy. 
To be clear, I am not (merely) attributing to Cohen the anodyne claim that philosophical 
inquiry is historical because it is done by knowers who are themselves historically situated. 
Rather, on his view, philosophers must engage in detailed, context-sensitive historical 
investigation, in order to come to know the principles of knowledge they seek -- even though 
 
3 For example, Wiedebach (1997: 126ff) and Deuber-Mankowsky (2000: 108ff) emphasize Cohen’s concern with 
history at least in part as a consequence of their interest in his view of unending moral progress through history and 
into the future (a view I will consider in §7). In contrast, Renz (2002) and Luft (2015) are both concerned with 
locating in Cohen the resources for a philosophy of culture, and indeed, as Renz (2002: 89ff) emphasizes, a culture 
that changes through history. Of these commentators, Luft comes closest to denying the other strain in Cohen’s 
thinking: at points he seems to deny that the principles Cohen thinks philosophy aims to identify are strictly 
universal (Luft 2015: 54). 
 
4 Some commentators have attempted to keep equally in view both Cohen’s concern with what is universal in 
knowledge and with knowledge’s historical origins and development. Renz (2018: 10) and Baumann (2019: 651) 
touch on this topic but do not pursue it in detail. While Damböck (2017) explicitly aims to reconcile these two 
strains, his interpretation differs in certain respects from the one I defend here. See Edgar (2020a) for more on 
Damböck. Fiorato’s (1993) account approaches the problem from a different starting point than I do here, namely, 
from Cohen’s mature Logic of Pure Knowledge. But despite that difference, I believe (though cannot here argue) 
that my account largely confirms Fiorato’s central contention that for Cohen the “[g]round of being must be laid 




those principles are objects of knowledge that are themselves timelessly, ahistorically valid. That 
is, Cohen maintains that history provides the evidence required for the critical philosopher to 
identify certain principles that are themselves nevertheless timelessly valid. In fact, Cohen 
maintains this in two, closely related ways. First, on his account, historical investigation is what 
first reveals the timelessly valid principles the critical philosopher aims to identify. Then, second, 
historical investigation is required to justify the critical philosopher’s account of what is (or is 
not) one of those timessly valid principles. 
 These are surely striking claims. Practitioners of other disciplines aiming to investigate 
objects of knowledge that are timelessly valid typically think history plays no essential role in 
their disciplines. Mathematicians and physicists might use history for pedagogical purposes, but 
they do not normally think it is a necessary part of their disciplines' methods. 
Nor is this point limited to mathematics or physics. Kant -- Cohen’s inspiration for what 
he calls the “transcendental method” -- seems to have a similar view in at least some central parts 
of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Transcendental Analytic proceed without much reference to history. Kant’s own example thus 
seems to suggest that when the transcendental philosopher seeks to identify universally valid 
principles of knowledge, history is not directly relevant to that account and need not play a 
central or essential role in it. But, I will argue, Cohen disagrees. 
My argument proceeds as follows. §§2 and 3 address the first of my two principal claims: 
that for Cohen historical investigation is required to investigate principles of knowledge that are 
nevertheless timelessly valid. §2 provides textual evidence to establish that, for Cohen, those 
principles really are timessly valid, but also that, in at least some works, he thinks historical 




argument that, on Cohen’s view, history is also required to justify a philosophical account of 
what those principles are (or are not).  
From there, I attempt to see what explanation Cohen has for these striking views. My 
strategy is genealogical. In §4 I examine the views of history held by four of Cohen’s teachers -- 
Zacharias Frankel, Heinrich Graetz, Adolf Trendelenburg, and Heymann Steinthal -- in order to 
locate ideas about history that Cohen would take up and adapt. §5 examines how Cohen develops 
those ideas, specifically, in the interpretation of Kant’s things in themselves that he develops 
over the late-1870s and 1880s. §6 establishes the second of my two principal claims: it argues 
that Cohen’s account of things in themselves provides the explanation for why history plays the 
role in philosophical method that it does for him. The underlying reasoning of Cohen’s 
explanation is the result of how he combines different ideas from Frankel, Graetz, Trendeleburg, 
and Steinthal. Finally, §7 provides a too-brief sketch of the trajectory of these ideas in Cohen’s 
writing beyond the 1880s and beyond his theoretical philosophy. I argue that, throughout the 
remainder of Cohen’s career, he had the resources to explain why historical investigation is 
required to reveal timelessly valid ideas, and why it is required to justify a philosophical account 
of those ideas. 
However, before any of that, I must make an important qualification. My focus mostly 
emphasizes Cohen’s writings from the late-1870s and 1880s. While some discussion of Cohen’s 
earlier writings is necessary, those earlier writings are less telling for my purposes. Prior to the 
late-1870s, Cohen’s commitment to the timeless validity of formal conditions of experience is 
arguably equivocal,5  and so the questions I am considering do not arise with perfect clarity. 
 
5 See Schmidt 1976 and Edel 2010 for the suggestion that into the 1870s, Cohen maintained a concern with 
understanding the subjective, psychological sources of knowledge, in a manner that is not obviously consistent with 




Also, while I consider Cohen’s mature (post-1900) System of Philosophy in §7, I do so with only 
a very limited goal: to track the trajectory of certain ideas I identify in his writings from the late-
1870s and 1880s. Insofar as my account of Cohen’s mature philosophy is this unambitious, my 
account of his views of the role of history in philosophical method remains incomplete. I hope at 
least it points to where further investigation would be fruitful. 
 
§2. One role that history plays in the transcendental method. 
For Cohen, the aim of a critical theory of knowledge (or what in the 1880s he calls the 
“critique of knowledge” [Cohen 1883: §8]) is to identify principles and laws within 
mathematical natural scientific theories that ground experience and thereby make it objective. 
Starting in the first edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience and continuing into the 1880s, he 
calls those principles “formal conditions” of experience (Cohen 1871: 93ff and 1885: 214). He 
also calls them “constituting conditions of experience,” and on his view they are constitutive of 
experience’s possibility (Cohen 1871: 94/1885: 217).6 
 Further, on Cohen’s account the critique of knowledge identifies these formal conditions 
using a specific method, namely, the “transcendental method.” For Cohen, that method takes as 
its starting point the theories of mathematical natural science, and then investigates them in order 
to identify the formal conditions contained in them (see Cohen 1877: iv and 1885: 66ff). By 
means of the transcendental method, it is thus possible to identify and exhibit these formal 
conditions in their systematic connections to one another, and thus (Cohen thinks) to explain the 
validity of the scientific theories that contain them. 
 




 Crucially, for Cohen the formal conditions of experience are objects of knowledge that 
are “universally valid and strictly necessary” (Cohen 1871: 10/1885: 99). In that respect, they 
contrast with principles that have a merely “relative” validity or necessity. In other words, Cohen 
assigns to these principles a validity that is timeless: their validity does not vary over time, or 
from one historical period to another. Thus Cohen insists that the “transcendental validity” of the 
formal conditions of experience stands apart from the “historical-developmental genesis” of 
them (Cohen 1885: 198). 
 Nevertheless, for Cohen history is required for philosophy done according to the 
transcendental method. At the very least, the sheer number of pages that Cohen devotes to 
history suggests that he thinks it is required for that philosophy. For example, more than half of 
the Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (1883)7 and almost all of the long 
introduction Cohen adds to the second edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience are devoted to 
historical surveys of his topics, to say nothing of the fact that all three of his Kant books are 
ultimately works in the history of philosophy. 
 One passage that strongly suggests he thinks history is required for a critical account of 
knowledge comes in his early essay “On the Controversy between Trendelenburg and Kuno 
Fischer.” There, Cohen is prompted to reflect explicitly on the relation between history and 
philosophy because that relation was already an issue in the Trendelenburg-Fischer debate. 
Trendelenburg had criticized Fischer’s interpretation of Kant as historically inaccurate -- a 
criticism that Cohen accepts, despite also not accepting Trendelenburg's own objections to Kant. 
 
7 Only one of the Infinitesimal Method’s three parts is called “History.” However, it is the longest section of the 
book. Further, more than half of the first, introductory part is also devoted to history (§§28-49), surveying the 
development of the infinitesimal concept from the ancient period to Barrow, just prior to Leibniz and Newton. 





Cohen thus argues that, in the history of philosophy, the twin aims of systematic analysis and 
“documentary faithfulness” are mutually reinforcing. In the context of this view, Cohen insists 
that, while the object of philosophical analysis, a “thought,” is the product of a rational process, 
nevertheless “the collected mass of historical facts must be brought to bear” on its analysis 
Cohen (1928 [1871]: 272).8 Thus, here Cohen is perfectly explicit that history is required for the 
kind of systematic philosophical task he wants to undertake. 
 Still, Cohen’s remarks on history in this early dispute do not decisively establish that, for 
him, historical investigation is required to first reveal the formal conditions of experience. After 
all, while that essay was written at the same time as the first edition of Kant’s Theory of 
Experience, in which Cohen uses something like the transcendental method to identify the formal 
conditions of experience, it is less clear what method Cohen is using in that essay itself. 
 For our purposes, a more telling text is the Infinitesimal Method. Written six years after 
Cohen first articulated the transcendental method in Kant’s Foundations of Ethics (1877), it is 
clearly an application of that method with the aim of identifying a particular formal condition of 
experience, namely, what Cohen calls the principle of reality. Further, the Infinitesimal Method 
contains several important passages where Cohen reflects explicitly on the importance of history 
for his systematic philosophical aims in the book. He is explicit that historical investigation is 
required to reveal the formal conditions of experience.  
The clearest passages for our purposes come in the forward to the Infinitesimal Method. 
Although short, it is given over almost entirely to explaining and justifying Cohen’s use of 
history in the pursuit of systematic philosophical aims. Cohen makes explicit his view that 
history is required for the critical project he is undertaking in the book. He says, “[n]owhere was 
 




there such a need for me [Nirgend ist es mir so sehr Bedürfniss gewesen], and nowhere did it 
seem so immediately useful, to pursue a systematically decisive idea at the same time with its 
historical development” (Cohen 1883: iii). There was, Cohen says, a “need” for him to pursue his 
systematic aims not just systematically, but with historical investigation as well. This is a point 
he returns to in the long introductory section of the Infinitesimal Method, perhaps because he is 
aware that some readers will think it is odd that he is taking such a historical approach to 
systematic philosophical questions (Cohen 1883: §15). 
 Further, in the forward to the Infinitesimal Method, Cohen offers a brief explanation for 
why he felt the need to pursue his systematic aims with so much historical investigation. That 
explanation is framed by Cohen’s response to the problem that philosophers who talk about 
mathematics (as he is about to do) can come off as dilettantes. He says, “Hegel made a fool of 
himself precisely with his trainwreck of a criticism of” the concept of the infinitesimal (Cohen 
1883: iii). Cohen then explains how he proposes to avoid Hegel’s mistakes: 
I have removed the danger of dilettantish talk about mathematical questions, which 
belong to the problem in another context, by means of the historical context in which the 
origin of the idea was considered, because for my purposes I kept principally to the 
sources. What is taken to be a foundation, or as one says, a logical presupposition of 
science, can initially be revealed only by a historical perspective. (Cohen 1883: iii-iv; 
emphasis added) 
Again, Cohen makes explicit that his critical project in the Infinitesimal Method requires 
historical investigation. The transcendental method aims to identify the formal conditions of 
experience. Here, Cohen proposes to identify the particular formal condition that is the principle 




taking a historical approach to the investigation of that concept, keeping “principally” to its 
historical “sources.”  
However, Cohen tells us more than just the bare fact that historical investigation is 
required for a critical account of knowledge done according to the transcendental method He 
tells us how historical investigation is required. He informs us in this passage that the formal 
conditions of experience he aims to identify (the “logical presupposition[s] of science”) “can 
initially be revealed only by a historical perspective.” That is, Cohen insists, historical 
investigation is required to first reveal the formal conditions of experience to the critical 
philosopher.  
 
§3. A second role that history plays in the transcendental method. 
So Cohen himself insists that historical investigation is required to reveal the formal 
conditions of experience. However, if we pay systematic attention to how he argues for his own 
views in the Infinitesimal Method, we will see that history plays another, closely related, role for 
him. Cohen’s own arguments reveal that history is required for the critical philosopher’s 
justification of their accounts of what is (or is not) a formal condition of experience. That is, the 
critical philosopher cannot justify their views about what is (and is not) a formal condition of 
experience without appealing to the history of science, mathematics, and philosophy.  
Very often in Cohen, we find that historical surveys take the place of systematic 
definitions and arguments for his views. Where we might expect to find a systematic argument, 
we more often find a detailed historical survey of the topic or concept at hand. Cohen’s historical 
surveys are thus unavoidable if we want to understand the meanings of Cohen’s key concepts or 




Consider how Cohen typically introduces concepts in the course of his exposition. He 
often declines to define a concept in systematic detail. Instead, he rehearses a history of how the 
concept was introduced into philosophy (or mathematical natural science) and how its meaning 
was shaped over the course of the history of philosophy (or mathematical natural science). He 
does this even for the concepts that are most central to the views he means to defend. 
For example, consider the concept of idealism as Cohen articulates it in the long 
historical introduction he adds to the second edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience. One aim of 
that introduction is precisely to articulate and defend Cohen’s conception of that concept. But he 
does not define it in detailed, systematic terms. Instead, he surveys the history of the view that 
mathematical ideas give knowledge its validity, and how that view was developed in the hands 
of Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant (Cohen 1885: 8-17, 22-43, 55-66). Cohen’s treatment of 
the central concepts of the Infinitesimal Method (for example, the concepts limit, differential, 
continuity, intensive magnitude, and reality) is similar: for each concept, Cohen declines to give 
a systematic definition, and instead gives the concept meaning by rehearsing its origins and 
development in the history of mathematics, physics, and philosophy.     
Even more telling, consider the role that history plays in how Cohen argues for his views, 
and against the views’ he means to reject. He only rarely defends his views with straightforward 
arguments in the form of premises entailing a conclusion, even for the central views he aims to 
establish in a given text. He likewise often does not offer objections to or arguments against his 
opponents’ views. In the place of those arguments, he rehearses arguments in various episodes in 
the history of philosophy, with certain historical positions standing in for his own views, and 




Consider Cohen’s concept of the infinitesimal -- a concept that is closely connected to the 
principle of reality, the formal condition of experience he is most concerned with in the 
Infinitesimal Method. Throughout that book, Cohen aims to establish that a certain conception of 
infinitesimals is right: roughly, a magnitude is infinitesimal just in case it is greater than 0 but no 
finite magnitude is small enough to equal its value.9  He likewise aims to show that certain 
conceptions of infinitesimals are wrong, and should be rejected. These views include any attempt 
to conceive of infinitesimals as “negligible” finite magnitudes (Cohen 1883: §35), or to define 
infinitesimals by appeal to some given, very small finite value (e.g., Cohen 1883: §§54, 55, 67). 
But nowhere in the Infinitesimal Method does Cohen offer a systematic argument in favour of 
the former conception of infinitesimals or against the latter conceptions. Instead, he works 
through various episodes in early modern mathematics, physics, and philosophy, highlighting 
figures who developed conceptions of infinitesimals (or continuity, limits, or differentials) that 
express some key aspect of the former view. He contrasts those figures’ views with the views of 
other figures who endorse the latter (for Cohen, wrong) views.10 
For example, consider Cohen’s discussions of Varignon’s claim that the infinitesimal is 
“inexhaustible” (Cohen 1883: §55) and Leibniz’s suggestion that the infinitesimal is “the 
unterminated” (Cohen 1883: §55), and so it cannot be measured by a finite value. He praises 
 
9 For a detailed account of Cohen’s concept of infinitesimal, see Edgar (2020c). 
 
10  I have defended this interpretation of Cohen’s argument for his conception of the infinitesimal concept at length 
elsewhere (see Edgar [2020c]). Still, some readers might object to my claim that Cohen’s survey of the history of 
mathematics (and physics and philosophy) is essential for understanding his reasons for his conception of the 
infinitesimal. It is tempting to think that Cohen’s conception of infinitesimals depends primarily on his interpretation 
of Kant’s Anticipations of Perception. I do not wish to deny the importance of the Anticipations for Cohen’s 
argument in the Infinitesimal Method. But that does not undermine my present claim that Cohen’s historical surveys 
of mathematics (and physics and philosophy) play an essential role in his arguments. Cohen’s explicit discussion of 
Kant’s Anticipations appears as only three sections in the midst of a historical survey that takes up more than half of 
the book. Cohen interprets the Anticipations by placing them in a detailed, context-sensitive, and comprehensive 
history of the concept of the infinitesimal. My claim here is that that larger historical context is essential for 




these views. In contrast, he rejects Leibniz’s claim that the infinitesimal might be understood by 
analogy to a grain of sand in comparison to the whole earth (Cohen 1883: §§55, 67), which is an 
imagistic metaphor that smacks of treating the infinitesimal as negligible. Understanding 
Cohen’s reasons for his concept of the infinitesimal requires us to understand why he praises one 
of Leibniz’s characterizations of the infinitesimal (along with Varignon’s), but rejects another.  
Thus for Cohen, the justification for his views of the infinitesimal concept emerges from 
his total narrative account of the infinitesimal in early modern mathematics, physics, and 
philosophy. In that sense, Cohen offers no argument for his own conception of infinitesimals that 
can stand independently of his historical narrative. Rather, this is a case where, as Cohen puts it 
in the forward to the Infinitesimal Method, “[n]owhere was there such a need for me, and 
nowhere did it seem so immediately useful, to pursue a systematically decisive idea at the same 
time with its historical development” (Cohen 1883: iii).  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing an important feature of the historical surveys that Cohen 
offers in the place of systematic definitions and arguments: they are detailed and context-
sensitive. Indeed, Cohen seems committed to what we might call historical contextualism. By 
historical contextualism, I mean the conjunction of two commitments. First, Cohen aims to 
understand historical figures, at least in the first instance, on their own terms and representing 
their views accurately.11  Thus, for example, Cohen often uses historical figures’ own 
terminology to express their views, avoiding anachronistic vocabulary in his accounts of those 
 
11 Contextualism, as I mean it here, thus involves what Christia Mercer has recently called the aim of getting things 
right (Mercer 2019). In attributing this aim to Cohen, I follow Beiser (2014: 467, 483) and Beiser (2018: 61ff). 
Others, such as Kühn (2009), argue that Cohen’s interpretation of historical figures is guided, first and foremost, by 
his own systematic philosophical considerations. I cannot here mediate this disagreement. I will only note that there 
might be less disagreement here than it seems: by the standards of Cohen’s time, his approach to the history of 
philosophy and science stood out for (what I call) its contextualism; but also, by our standards of scholarship in the 
history of modern philosophy and science, we can certainly see the ways that Cohen’s interpretations of historical 




views. Second, Cohen aims to understand historical figures’ views by placing those views in the 
broader intellectual context of their historical period. In so doing, he sometimes reveals his 
awareness of what we now call the distinction between actors’ and analysts’ categories. 
Cohen’s historical contextualism is clear in the Infinitesimal Method, in his discussions of 
theorizing about infinitesimals and limits before Leibniz. Consider how, in his discussions of 
early modern analytic geometry, he describes Kepler’s (Cohen 1883: §38) and Fermat’s (Cohen 
1883: §39) views in their own, idiosyncratic terminology. Likewise, his discussion of Newton’s 
calculus is expressed in Newton’s vocabulary of fluxions and fluents (Cohen 1883: §§62-66), 
despite the fact that Cohen’s own concern is with infinitesimals. Cohen draws out the point he 
wants to take from Newton about differentials (and the relation between the finite and the 
infinite) only after he has presented Newton’s views in Newton’s own vocabulary (Cohen 1883: 
§67). 
 Moreover, Cohen is often at pains to capture the broader intellectual motivations for a 
figure’s concern with a philosophical problem, and how those motivations differ between figures 
and between historical periods. Over the course of Cohen’s history of the concept of the 
infinitesimal in the early modern period, he notes the following as (some of) the motivations 
driving a concern with infinitesimals: Leibniz’s psychology of perception (Cohen 1883: §51); his 
theory of monads (Cohen 1883: §51); his concern to give a definition of number (Cohen 1883: 
§53); problems in his physics (Cohen 1883: §§49, 53, 56); Newton’s metaphysical concern with 
the nature of space and time (Cohen 1883: §64) as well as his physics (Cohen 1883: §§62, 64). 
Pulling back from the details of Cohen’s history of calculus, the important point for our 
purposes is this. In the Infinitesimal Method, Cohen is concerned to defend a particular concept 




of reality. But Cohen’s arguments in defense of those views do not stand independently of his 
detailed, context-sensitive historical surveys. That is, as Cohen presents his views, those 
historical surveys are required for their justification.  
We have thus identified the two roles that history plays in critical philosophy for Cohen: 
as he says, history first reveals the formal conditions of experience; but then, as Cohen’s own 
arguments show, history is also required for the critical philosopher’s justification of the views 
about what those formal conditions are (and aren’t). 
 
§4. The origins of Cohen’s teleological conception of history 
 I now turn to my second principal claim, namely, that Cohen has the resources to explain 
why history plays the role that it does in critical philosophy as he conceives it. That is, we need 
to see why Cohen thinks that the formal conditions of experience are first revealed by 
investigation into the history of science. Likewise, we need to see why the critical philosopher 
has to appeal to history to justify their views about what the formal conditions of experience are. 
 It is helpful to take a genealogical approach to finding these explanations. For the 
resources Cohen has to answer these questions are ones he develops out of background views of 
history that he inherits from some of his most important teachers and mentors, including 
Zacharias Frankel, Heinrich Graetz, Adolf Trendelenburg, and Heymann Steinthal.12  
This is hardly an exhaustive list of his important influences. But while incomplete, it at 
least serves to illustrate that, at every major stage of Cohen’s education -- as a rabbinical student 
in Breslau, as a philosophy student in Berlin, and as a young researcher in Berlin in the years 
 





immediately after he earned his doctorate in 1865 -- Cohen was influenced by teachers who had 
robustly teleological conceptions of history.  
Further, these teachers had views that Cohen would later develop and adapt in the context 
of his critique of knowledge and later writings. Specifically, Frankel, Graetz, and Trendelenburg 
all held (i) that there are timelessly valid ideas; (ii) that history develops progressively towards 
the complete articulation of those ideas; and crucially (iii) that historical investigation is required 
to reveal the content of those timelessly valid ideas. Steinthal, for his part, held that history has a 
teleological structure, and that progress through history consists in concepts coming to have 
increasingly universal meanings. We will see in §6 that Cohen combines these different views, 
and in so doing develops the resources to explain why, on his account, historical investigation is 
required to reveal the formal conditions of experience and to justify a philosophical account of 
them. 
Our ultimate aim is to understand Cohen’s view of the role of history of science in his 
critique of knowledge and his transcendental method. But for our purposes in this section, we are 
interested in the views that Cohen, as a student, might have learned about history per se. 
Consequently, we need to take account of what, say, Trendelenberg taught Cohen about the 
structure of the history of science. But we should also take into account the views of the history 
of culture that Steinthal taught, and the views of the history of Judaism that Frankel and Graetz 
taught. Despite not being histories of philosophy or science (narrowly construed), they can shed 
light on how Cohen, in the 1870s and 1880s, came to think about the structure of the history per 






4.1 Zacharias Frankel and Heinrich Graetz 
Before Cohen began any formal study of philosophy, he spent four years studying to be a 
rabbi at the Jewish Theological Seminary in Breslau. There, the seminary’s first Director, 
Zacharias Frankel, was an important mentor for Cohen, and his history professor was Heinrich 
Graetz.13 They belonged to a movement in Jewish scholarship called Wissenschaft des 
Judentums. Influenced by critical philological and historical methods in German universities, the 
movement consisted above all in the project of studying Jewish history “critically.” Although 
Frankel and Graetz had somewhat differing views of the application of critical scholarly methods 
to ancient Jewish texts, they both held that, for example, ancient accounts of the authorship of 
sacred texts should be scrutinized (and even rejected) using philological and historical methods. 
Cohen was an important disciple of this movement, and taught in the years before his death at the 
Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin. 
 Both Frankel and Graetz were historical contextualists in the sense I defined above. They 
aimed to identify the essence or idea of Judaism, but thought detailed historical investigation was 
required for that task. Frankel argues that the idea of a people “constitutes the truest content of its 
history,” but the content of that idea is revealed by the people’s laws, which evolve and develop 
through its history (Frankel 1852: 243).14  Consequently, he maintains “[h]istory. . . must not be 
construed and arranged a priori, according to preconceived concepts” (Frankel 1860: 125). 
 
13 Cohen had a warm relationship with Frankel but a prickly one with Graetz, and Cohen ultimately rejected 
Graetz’s maximally particularist view of the nature of Judaism. Nevertheless, while Cohen does not end up with a 
conception of history and how to do it that is in every respect exactly like Graetz’s, his own remembrance of Graetz 
makes it clear how much he admired him as a historian (Cohen 1924). Manuel Joël also deserves mention in this list 
as Cohen’s history of philosophy teacher at the Breslau Seminary. I omit discussion of him here for considerations 
of space, but see Adelmann (2010: 110ff) for discussion of his influence on Cohen’s conception of science. 
 




Graetz, for his part, opens his 1846 essay, “The Structure of Jewish History,” by mocking 
precisely the idea that the essence of Judaism could be known prior to detailed historical 
investigation (Graetz 1975 [1846]: 63-4). He insists instead that the content of the idea of 
Judaism is revealed only in Jewish history. There is thus no way to know the content of that idea 
in advance of historical investigation, and no way to use the idea as a criterion for distinguishing 
significant from insignificant periods in Jewish history. Consequently, Jewish historians, indeed 
the movement of Wissenschaft des Judentums, must be concerned with the totality of Jewish 
history, not just select periods of it (Graetz 1975 [1846]: 65). Hence the sheer size of Graetz’s 
own attempt to survey Jewish history: his History of the Jews, published over the period 1853-
1876 (including the years when Cohen was his student), runs to eleven volumes. 
At the same time, both Frankel and Graetz insist that the idea of Judaism has a timeless 
validity. As Graetz puts it, the idea of Judaism is “the soul which animates and guides the 
organism of Judaism” (Graetz 1975 [1846]: 65). Indeed, both Frankel and Graetz embed their 
views of a timelessly valid idea in a larger, teleological conception of history. On this 
conception, the idea of Judaism is the telos of Jewish history. For Frankel, Jewish history is not 
really history so long as it is conceived as “an unbroken series of sufferings. . .” But as soon as it 
reaches its end, “the electric spark breaks out, which illuminates the whole great series and 
reveals its side of light; one recognizes that it [that is, Jewish history] was sustained by a living 
spirit - and this is the very object of history. . .” (Frankel 1852: 523)     
For Graetz, “Jewish history, in all its phases, . . exhibits a single idea” and “in fact, it 
constitutes a concrete explication of a fundamental concept” (Graetz 1975 [1846]: 65-66). That 




aspects of the idea of Judaism that had previously been only latent. Thus the complete 
explication of the idea of Judaism is the end towards which Jewish history unfolds. 
 
4.2 Adolf Trendelenburg 
No less than Frankel or Graetz, Trendelenburg has a teleological conception of history. 
He held the chair in philosophy in Berlin, and was both a historian of ancient philosophy and a 
systematic metaphysician. His best-known work is his Logical Investigations, which first 
appeared in 1840, but he also wrote several important books of Aristotle scholarship. 
Trendelenburg taught Cohen when Cohen came to Berlin as an undergraduate, and later served 
with Steinthal on Cohen’s doctoral dissertation committee. 
In some works, such as his books on Aristotle, Trendelenburg is concerned principally to 
get Aristotle and other figures right on their own terms and to understand their philosophical 
views by placing those views in their historical contexts. For example, in Trendelenburg’s 
critical notes on Aristotle’s logic, he provides paragraph by paragraph exegesis of Aristotle’s 
text, giving careful reconstructions of Aristotle’s arguments. Trendelenburg is careful to 
distinguish actors’ categories from analysts’ categories (Trendelenburg 1898 [1836]: 28, 29), and 
he explicates Aristotle’s doctrines by appeal to Aristotle’s intellectual context, for example, to 
ancient Greek practices in astronomy (Trendelenburg 1898 [1836]: 29). 
In his Logical Investigations, Trendelenburg has his own systematic aims. While he pays 
less attention to fine-grained historical detail than he does in his Aristotle interpretation, the 
views he defends are even more instructive for our purposes. Trendelenburg aims to defend what 
he calls the “organic worldview.” On his view, the world is an organic whole, and each 




sufficiently mature, reflect that organic structure: the individual sciences are unified into an 
interconnected, organic whole that has the same organic unity that the world has. For 
Trendelenburg, it is the task of philosophy (or, in his terms, logic) to articulate the 
interconnections between the individual sciences that constitute their organic unity. Thus for 
Trendelenburg, the organic worldview is the “principle” of the sciences and philosophy 
(Trendelenburg 1862: viii).15 
Two points about Trendelenburg’s conception of the organic worldview are important for 
us. First, that worldview is universally, and so eternally, true (Trendelenburg 1862: 6). 
But second, philosophy develops an increasingly articulated conception of that worldview 
through history. Trendelenburg thinks the individual sciences develop in a scattered manner at 
different points in history. At first, they appear unconnected, not part of a larger whole. But as 
those sciences develop, it becomes possible to begin recognizing how they in fact comprise a 
unified, interconnected whole (Trendelenburg 1862: 5). It falls to philosophy to articulate the 
organic worldview to the extent possible, given the particular stage of development that the 
individual sciences are at. As Trendelenburg puts it, it is philosophy’s task to “seek out and 
present the idea of the universal in the particular” (Trendelenburg 1862: 6). Were it possible to 
consider all the individual sciences when they were complete -- as he puts it, when “the universe 
[is] recreated by the knowing spirit” (Trendelenburg 1862: 6) -- philosophy could represent the 
individual sciences as a “whole organism,” where each individual science is represented as a 
member of the whole. But Trendelenburg maintains that a complete articulation of the organic 
worldview lies in an infinitely distant future (Trendelenburg 1862: 6). As the sciences develop, 
philosophy can approach the complete articulation of the organic worldview, but it can never 
 
15 See Beiser (2013): 32ff for a more thorough account of Trendelenburg's organic worldview. Translations from 




reach it. Thus Trendelenburg’s conception of the organic worldview is explicitly teleological: for 
him, the realization of it -- that is, the complete unification of the individual sciences into an 
organic whole -- is the end towards which the history of science and philosophy progresses. 
A last point about Trendelenburg is important. He argues that the idea of the organic 
worldview is revealed to philosophy in its own history, especially in the works of Aristotle and 
Plato. More generally, he argues that the history of philosophy is necessary and relevant to 
systematic philosophy, providing warnings to the systematic philosopher about mistakes to 
avoid, and hints about the views the philosopher ought to adopt (Trendelenburg 1846: i-ii). 
However, even when Trendelenburg conceives of history of philosophy as serving the needs of 
systematic philosophy, he maintains that history can serve those needs only when the 
philosopher initially takes pains to get the history of philosophy right on its own terms. As he 
puts it, “[t]he first duty of the researcher is to know history in its distinctiveness...” 
(Trendelenburg 1846: viii). Thus even when philosophers aim to discover timelessly valid truths, 
Trendelenburg thinks those truths are first revealed by philosophy’s history. 
 
4.3 Heymann Steinthal 
 Like Trendelenburg, Steinthal served on Cohen’s dissertation committee in Berlin, but he 
was also a close mentor to Cohen during the years immediately after Cohen earned his 
doctorate.16 Steinthal was a philosopher and philologist, and was, along with Moritz Lazarus, a 
founder of the discipline of Völkerpsychologie, which they conceived as the investigation of the 
spirit of different cultures at different stages in history.  
 




 No less than Trendelenburg, Steinthal was a historical contextualist. In a series of books 
he wrote on the history of language throughout the 1850s and 1860s, he supports his historical 
claims with exhaustive etymological arguments, as well as detailed surveys of the vocabulary, 
grammar, and style of the language in various ancient texts. Steinthal likewise maintains that 
historical figures and texts must be understood in relation to their broader historical contexts. On 
his view, Völkerpsychologie stands in various relations of mutual interdependence with other 
historical disciplines, such as history of philosophy and history of culture. For example, the 
history of language illuminates the history of culture and is a complement to the history of 
philosophy (Steinthal 1863: 3).17 Thus historical texts in philosophy must be interpreted in light 
of an intellectual context that includes the relevant period’s language, science, and culture.  
 Steinthal also has a teleological conception of history, though his commitment to that 
conception is more complicated than it is in Frankel, Graetz, or Trendelenburg. For Steinthal’s 
teleological conception of history is one strain in his writing that sits in an uneasy tension with 
another strain that aims to explain historical, Völkerpsychological processes in terms of purely 
mechanistic laws of association.18 
 However, we in no way minimize that ambivalence in Steinthal’s views if we recognize 
the strain in his writing on history that is unabashedly teleological. That strain is impossible to 
ignore in his Philosophy, History, and Psychology (1864). For example, one of the organizing 
ideas of that book is a distinction between two different kinds of movement of spirit. One kind of 
movement is cyclical (Steinthal 1864: 32). Steinthal repeatedly likens this movement to natural, 
causal-mechanical processes like earthquakes or rivers filling with silt (Steinthal 1864: 32, 46). 
 
17 See also Steinthal (1864). 
 
18 See for example Lazarus and Steinthal (1860: 10-11) See Kusch (2019) for a more detailed account of the 




He claims this kind of movement does not increase the “value” of spirit (Steinthal 1864: 32). In 
contrast, there is also movement of spirit that is progressive. Steinthal is explicit that this 
movement is teleological (Steinthal 1864: 32n). It does increase the “value” of spirit (Steinthal 
1864: 40, 46). In this kind of movement, Steinthal allows that spiritual decay is still a possibility, 
but when it happens, it sews the seeds of still further spiritual progress (Steinthal 1864: 32).19 
 For our purposes, this distinction is important because Steinthal uses it to define the 
difference between peoples he calls “unhistorical” and “historical” (Steinthal 1864: 30-32, 39-40, 
46). On his account, some peoples never develop in ways that increase the value of spirit, while 
others do develop that way. Strictly speaking for Steinthal, only the latter are “historical.” Thus 
on his view of what counts as history, it is progressive and thus teleological. 
 While Steinthal is clear that history has this progressive structure, he is less clear about 
what exactly it progresses towards. He says that he “emphasize[s] that history has a teleological 
character; but it does not follow from this that we must now also posit an ultimate end to history” 
(Steinthal 1864: 32n).20 The context leaves it unclear what exactly he means by this: perhaps that 
historical progress will never end, or that the history of spirit is not progressing towards a single, 
individual ideal. 
 That said, Steinthal is perfectly clear about at least one ideal that the history of spirit 
progresses towards. On his view, progress through history involves the development of concepts 
from representing the particular meanings of individuals towards representing more and more 
universal meanings shared by entire peoples. Steinthal repeatedly uses the image of a ladder to 
describe that development (Steinthal 1864: 3, 14). Thus for him, universality of concepts is an 
 
19 This is a point Steinthal makes repeatedly. See also Lazarus and Steinthal (1860: 63) and Steinthal (1863: 267, 
380). 
 




end that history progresses towards, and as a people’s concepts become more universal, the 
“value” of their spirit is thereby increased.  
 Steinthal’s conception of progress through history had a direct influence on Cohen: 
during the period that Cohen was studying with Steinthal in the 1860s and writing 
Völkperpsychologie, he echoed Steinthal’s view that progress in knowledge consists in moving 
away from concepts representing the particular sensory experiences of individuals and towards 
representing more universal meanings shared by entire peoples (see especially Cohen 1868: 401, 
420-1).21 
 
To be sure, there are important differences between the philosophical projects and views 
of Frankel, Graetz, Trendelenburg, and Steinthal. However, despite the differences, there are also 
similarities that are important for us to recognize. First, there is no difficulty seeing when in 
Cohen’s education he was exposed to historically contextualist approaches to the history of 
philosophy. Frankel, Graetz, Trendelenburg, and Steinthal are all committed to understanding 
historical figures and texts on their own terms and in the contexts of their historical periods. Just 
as importantly for our purposes, all four maintain robustly teleological conceptions of history.  
Further, there are important similarities between Frankel’s, Graetz’s, and 
Trendelenburg’s teleological conceptions of history. Like Cohen later would, each maintains that 
(i) there are timelessly valid ideas, (ii) history develops progressively towards the complete 
articulation of those timelessly valid ideas, and (iii) historical investigation is required to reveal 
the content of those timelessly valid ideas. For Frankel and Graetz, the idea of Judaism is 
timelessly valid. But while they insist that it is impossible to have a fully articulated account of 
 
21 See my (2020b) for a more detailed discussion of Steinthal’s influence on Cohen on this point and Wiedebach 




the essence of Judaism in advance of that history’s end, detailed investigation into that history is 
nevertheless how we come to have any knowledge of that essence at all. For Trendelenburg, the 
organic worldview is timelessly valid. We could have a complete articulation of it only when 
“the universe [is] recreated by the knowing spirit” (Trendelenburg 1862: 6) -- that is, when the 
history of science reaches its (infinitely distant) end. But in the meantime, it is the history of 
philosophy (especially Plato and Aristotle) that provides our first hints about what the organic 
worldview is.  
Steinthal’s case is different, since it is unclear that he thinks history unfolds towards a 
single, univocal end. But for our purposes, what is most important in Steinthal’s view is this: on 
his teleological conception of history, a people’s spirit increases in “value” as its concepts 
progressively come to have more universal meanings. That is, for Steinthal the history of 
knowledge is characterized by progressive development towards ever-increasing universality. 
These teleological views of history are ones that Cohen takes up and adapts for his own 
purposes in his critique of knowledge and beyond. Importantly for our purposes, he combines 
and develops these views in a way that gives him the resources to explain why, on his view, 
historical investigation is what reveals the content of the timelessly valid ideas he is concerned 
with. 
 
§5. Cohen’s doctrine of the thing in itself 
 Nevertheless, Cohen never takes it as his explicit aim to explain why historical 
investigation is required to reveal the formal conditions of experience and to justify a 
philosophical account of them. Likewise, at least in the context of his critique of knowledge, it is 




emerge from a different context, as a consequence of his efforts to overcome a problem he faces 
in his moral philosophy, as he presents it in Kant’s Foundations of Ethics. This problem in 
Cohen’s moral philosophy is thus where we need to start, if we are to see his explanation for why 
historical investigation in required to reveal the formal conditions of experience and to justify a 
philosophical account of them.  
 Cohen begins his Kant’s Foundations of Ethics with a methodological problem. He 
articulates the transcendental method, and argues that it is the proper philosophical method for 
critical philosophy (Cohen 1877: 24ff). The problem arises from the fact that the transcendental 
method cannot be applied in a critical ethics in the same straightforward way that it applies in a 
critical account of knowledge. In a critical account of knowledge, as we have seen, the 
transcendental method aims to identify the formal conditions of experience, to exhibit them in 
their systematic relations to one another, and thereby to explain the objectivity of experience. 
However, a critical ethics aims to provide the foundation for ethical concepts. But the foundation 
for those ethical concepts cannot be furnished just by formal conditions of experience, because 
the validity of “oughts” does not depend on anything in experience ever actually confirming 
them. That is, a moral concept might be valid even if no actual moral agents ever conform to its 
prescriptions. Thus, Cohen concludes, identifying the formal conditions of experience cannot 
explain the validity of moral concepts. How, then, does the transcendental method apply in the 
context of a critical ethics? 
 Cohen’s strategy for responding to this problem is to argue that ethical concepts are 
required by a critical doctrine of experience. He calls this strategy his “epistemological 




Foundations of Ethics as demonstrating the connection between the doctrine of experience and 
ethics (Cohen 1877: 2, 4). 
 Cohen’s account of how the doctrine of experience requires ethical concepts is developed 
out of his interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic and (at least implicitly) the Analogies 
of Experience. Appealing to events that are beyond the limits of possible experience, and thus 
non-temporal, would violate the principles of the Analogies of Experience. Further, the idea that 
explanations conforming to those principles should be complete -- that is, the goal of giving such 
complete explanations -- is a methodological guard against any temptation to explain individual 
events in experience by appeal to events beyond the limits of possible experience. For Cohen, 
that idea is “a means of protection for the physical explanations of the world series according to 
their conditions, against the derivation of its members from heterogenous principles” (Cohen 
1877: 88-9). 
 However, that demand for complete explanations produces the Antinomies of Pure 
Reason. For example, the argument for the third Antinomy’s thesis claims that a complete 
explanation of an event within nature must ultimately appeal to a kind of cause that stands 
outside of nature. But the argument for the third Antinomy’s antithesis claims that any cause 
standing outside of nature would violate the principle that each event must be preceded by some 
other event in accordance with a law of nature. Thus, Cohen seems to argue, the resolution to the 
Antinomies is required to complete the critical doctrine that Kant’s principles of the Analogies 
are the only permissible way to explain individual events within experience. Following Kant, 
Cohen takes that resolution to be the cosmological idea of the world, and to include the concept 




the limits of explanations of appearances, and also requires that, within the limits of possible 
experience, those explanations are never complete (Cohen 1877: 88). 
 Crucially for Cohen’s aims in Kant’s Foundations of Ethics, the concept of freedom is 
the highest ideal of ethics, an ideal that organizes and systematizes all other concepts of the 
critical doctrine of ethics. On his view, then, those ethical concepts are ultimately justified by the 
concept of freedom, which is in turn required by the critical doctrine of experience.  
A striking feature of this account in Cohen is that much of the relevant Kant 
interpretation comes by way of an account of things in themselves and their distinction from 
appearances.22 The account of things in themselves that Cohen develops thus prepares the ground 
for his account of the Antinomies and the role of the concept of freedom for the critical doctrine 
of experience. But his discussion of things in themselves is most relevant for our purposes, since 
it is where we can most clearly see him develop a teleological view of the history of science and 
philosophy. 
 In giving an account of things in themselves, Cohen aims to answer at least two 
questions: what are things in themselves, and given that by definition they are unknown, what 
possible function can they have in a doctrine of experience? Indeed, his answer to the latter 
question is precisely that they remain unknown (Cohen 1877: 18, 28). His thinking is this. Any 
individual event within experience is explained or grounded by a law. As Cohen puts it, “laws 
are the realities that make the actual objective” (Cohen 1877: 20), or more simply, law means 
objective reality (Cohen 1877: 28). Larger patterns of phenomena within experience are 
explained, analogously, by still more general and comprehensive laws.  
 




However, this explanatory strategy breaks down when we come to all experience 
considered as a whole. For there is no way for a law both to remain limited to the sphere of 
experience and to subsume all of experience under a pattern that is more general and more 
comprehensive than all of experience. Thus there is a question about what could ground or 
explain the whole of experience. This question points us to, in Cohen’s words, the “intelligible 
contingency” of experience (Cohen 1877: 30). We thus come to the idea of a limit to what can be 
known or explained within experience. Following Kant, Cohen calls the concept that defines this 
limit the thing in itself (Cohen 1877: 16). For Cohen, “the laws lead to the idea of an intelligible 
something, to a thing in itself” (Cohen 1877: 30-31).  
However, the idea of a thing in itself is not just the idea of the limit of experience. It is 
the idea of the ground of experience: after all, we arrive at that concept by considering what 
would explain the whole of experience. However, the thing in itself is a ground that always 
remains unknown (Cohen 1877: 18). Thus for Cohen, the thing in itself is a methodological 
instrument of knowledge (Cohen 1877: 36). It is a concept that sets a methodological goal (albeit 
an unattainable one) of a complete explanation of all of experience. One of Cohen’s 
characteristic ways of putting this point draws on Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic:  
if the conditioned is given, then the complete series of conditions, the unconditioned, 
which is represented as an object, is thought as a task. . . . It [that is, the unconditioned] is 
the idea of the thing in itself for the concepts of appearances. (Cohen 1877: 67) 
For Cohen, the thing in itself is thus an idea in Kant’s sense of an idea of something 
unconditioned. The concept of things in themselves is not constitutive of possible experience 




indispensable methodological function of turning systematic unity into a “norm,” a norm of 
bringing concepts into agreement with one another (Cohen 1877: 78).23 
 Cohen’s account of things in themselves is important for his attempt to establish the 
foundations of ethical concepts and to determine the systematic relation between the doctrine of 
experience and the critical ethics. At the same time, Cohen also indicates the importance of the 
concept of things in themselves for the critical doctrine of experience considered independently 
of ethics. He repeats and develops that account in subsequent writing in the 1880s. 
 In Cohen’s Kant’s Foundations of Aesthetics (1889), he repeats the claim that all 
experience has an “intelligible contingency,” which points to the thing in itself. He is led to this 
point by his concern with establishing the validity of the concept of purposiveness, even though 
(like ethical concepts) its validity is not established by appeal to (mechanical) laws within 
experience (Cohen 1889: 117-120). In the second edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience (1885), 
Cohen again argues that the right way to conceive of the thing in itself is as the ground of the 
totality of possible experience, but also that the thing in itself so conceived always remains 
unknown. That is, for Cohen, it is not possible for us ever to know the complete totality of 
formal conditions of possible experience. But once again that concept is a methodological tool 
for scientific investigation. It sets a task, and to be sure an infinite task (Cohen 1885: 665). For 




23 The year after Cohen published Kant’s Foundations of Ethics, he gave his inaugural lecture in Marburg, “Plato’s 
Doctrine of Ideas and Mathematics.” In it, he develops an interpretation of Plato that bears important similarities to 
his account of things in themselves. For reasons of space, I cannot here do justice to Cohen’s Plato interpretation. 
But I must add that, on his interpretation, ideas cannot be hypostatized, and must be understood as hypotheses 
(Cohen 1878: 15). Each hypothesis explains something about experience, but then, in turn, is in need of further 





§6. Cohen’s teleological conception of history 
 With Cohen’s account of the thing in itself clearly in view, we can finally return to his 
conception of history and the question of why, for him, historical investigation is required to 
discover the formal conditions of experience and to justify a philosophical account of them. 
Cohen’s account of the thing in itself entails a robustly teleological conception of history -- one 
that echoes elements of the views held by Frankel, Graetz, Trendelenburg, and Steinthal. But 
Cohen does not simply reproduce his teachers’ teleological conception of history dressed up in 
Kantian vocabulary. Rather, he combines views we saw in Frankel, Graetz, and Trendelenburg 
with a view we saw in Steinthal. The result is a view that provides the resources to explain why, 
for Cohen, historical investigation has the role it does for him in a critical account of knowledge. 
 First we need to see how Cohen’s interpretation of the thing in itself entails a teleological 
conception of the history of science, mathematics, and philosophy. For Cohen, of course, the 
formal conditions of experience are universally, timelessly valid. But on his view, as we have 
just seen, the thing in itself is the complete articulation of the formal conditions of experience. 
As the complete articulation of the formal conditions of experience, the thing in itself is thus the 
goal that all scientific and critical philosophical progress aims to achieve. It is the goal that all 
scientific and critical philosophical inquiry progresses towards as it evolves through history.  
Note here the echoes of Frankel, Graetz, and Trendelenburg: like them, Cohen maintains 
that history unfolds progressively towards the complete articulation of timelessly valid ideas. 
Further echoing Trendelenburg, Cohen maintains that the complete articulation of those 
timelessly valid ideas is a goal that will never be reached in the course of the actual history of 
science. For Cohen, the thing in itself always remains unknown and the complete articulation of 




actual history of science, any critical philosophical account of those formal conditions will 
always remain partial, limited, or incomplete. Finally, we saw in §2 that Cohen thinks historical 
investigation is required to reveal the content of the timelessly valid ideas he aims to identify, 
that is, the formal conditions of experience. This commitment likewise echoes the views of 
Frankel, Graetz, and Trendelenburg. 
However, in one very important respect, Cohen’s interpretation of Kant’s thing in itself 
also echoes Steinthal’s view of the progress of concepts through history -- a view that Cohen 
himself had held in the 1860s. For Steinthal and the younger Cohen, as a people develops 
through history, their concepts will become more and more universal. Now, in Kant’s 
Foundations of Ethics, Cohen’s account of things in themselves entails the view that in the 
history of science, knowledge progressively becomes more and more general as it aims to 
explain wider domains of experience with more and more general laws.  
We can thus see the influence on Frankel’s, Graetz’s, Trendelenburg’s, and Steinthal’s 
teleological conceptions of history on Cohen’s interpretation of the thing in itself. But the details 
of Cohen’s interpretation also allow him to go beyond his teachers’ views. In particular, those 
details provide him with the resources to explain why historical investigation is required to 
reveal the formal conditions of experience, and why it is required for the critical philosopher to 
justify their account of what those formal conditions of experience are.  
Remember Cohen’s account of how we come to have the idea of the thing in itself as a 
regulative ideal. On his view, an event within experience is grounded by a law -- that is, a stable 
regularity that obtains within an otherwise changing domain of experience. Indeed, he thinks an 
individual thing or event is made objective when it can be shown to follow from a law (Cohen 




follow from laws that are more general and more comprehensive than it -- that is, laws that 
remain stable over wider domains of experience. Thus, Cohen thinks, progress in science 
consists (at least in part) in showing that lower-level laws follow from more general and more 
comprehensive laws, and thus as science evolves through history it will tend to aim at 
establishing laws of ever-increasing generality and comprehensiveness. Further, remember that 
for Cohen this methodological drive continually to ground laws with further laws that are stable 
across ever-increasing domains of experience gives rise to the ideal of laws that would ground 
all of experience without exception. But for Cohen, that ideal just is the idea of the thing in itself, 
that is, the complete articulation of the system of formal conditions of experience (Cohen 1877: 
30-31; 1855: 641).24  
Of course, the thing in itself always remains unknown. Thus at any stage in the actual 
history of science, mathematics, and philosophy, it is not possible to identify the complete 
system of formal conditions of experience. The critical philosopher has epistemic access only to 
the laws and principles of the scientific theories that are extant at their particular stage in history.  
Nevertheless, the critical philosopher can still identify plausible candidates for laws and 
principles that have the status of formal conditions of experience. But doing so requires 
surveying the history of science up to that point. Attending to the history of science, the critical 
philosopher can identify elements of a theory that have remained stable across one theory’s 
replacement with a newer theory that is successful across a wider domain of experience. That 
element might survive multiple changes in theory, where each new successor theory succeeds 
across ever-increasing domains of experience. Surveying this historical trajectory, the critical 
 
24 I note here without pursuing it, for Cohen, the objectivity of every object or law depends on its being grounded by 
more general, more universal laws. At some point in this hierarchy of laws, we will come to laws that can be 
grounded only by more universal laws that have yet to be established by science. Thus, to borrow Fiorato’s 




philosopher can identify elements in the theories of their own stage of history that have survived 
across a succession of theory changes. The identification of those elements is not certain. It will 
never amount to an identification of the complete system of formal conditions of experience. On 
the contrary, as an attempt to identify those formal conditions, it will always be limited, partial, 
and incomplete. However, the identification of elements in scientific theories that have remained 
stable across a succession of theory changes is the way the critical philosopher can at least 
identify plausible candidates for what might be the formal conditions of experience. But then, for 
the critical philosopher to identify those plausible candidates for what might be formal 
conditions of experience, they need a historical view of the progress of science.  
We thus finally have Cohen’s explanation for why history is required to reveal the formal 
conditions of experience and why it is required to justify the philosopher’s account of what those 
formal conditions are. Surveying the trajectory that a succession of theories takes through the 
history of science is how the critical philosopher first identifies those laws and principles that 
have remained stable across ever-increasing domains of experience. That historical survey is thus 
required to identify laws and principles that are at least plausible candidates for formal 
conditions of experience. Thus Cohen insists that “[w]hat is taken to be a foundation, or as one 
says, a logical presupposition of science, can initially be revealed only by a historical 
perspective. (Cohen 1883: iii-iv).  
Likewise, the critical philosopher must show the trajectory that a succession of theories 
takes through the history of science, in order to demonstrate which laws and principles remain 
stable through the trajectory. The historical survey of that succession of theories is thus required 
for the critical philosopher to justify their claims about what is (or is not) a plausible candidate 




“[n]owhere was there such a need for me, and nowhere did it seem so immediately useful, to 
pursue a systematically decisive idea at the same time with its historical development” (Cohen 
1883: iii). 
With this explanation, we finally have a tolerably clear picture of the role that history 
plays in a critical account of knowledge and in the transcendental method, as Cohen conceives of 
that method. As Cohen insists, historical investigation is required to reveal the formal conditions 
of experience to the critical philosopher. Further, as his own argumentative methods show, he is 
also committed to the view that historical surveys are required for the critical philosopher to 
justify their accounts of what are (or are not) formal conditions of experience. Finally, for Cohen, 
this view of history’s role in the transcendental method is ultimately explained by the 
teleological conception of the history of science that is implicit in his interpretation of Kant’s 
thing in itself.  
 
§7. Cohen’s teleological conception of history in his mature writings. 
Before we can finish, we must see how Cohen develops these ideas in his mature, post-
1900 writings. My aim in this section is very limited. A complete account of Cohen’s view of the 
role of history in a philosophy that aims to investigate timelessly valid ideas would have to 
consider, for example, his treatment of the concept of temporality in his Logic of Pure 
Knowledge (1902).25 Here, I aim only to hint at how, in Cohen’s mature writings, he retains and 
develops the underlying reasoning I identified in the previous section: that is, his explanation for 
why historical investigation is required to first reveal timelessly valid principles, and then to 
justify a philosophical account of them. If anything, in his mature logic, ethics, and philosophy 
 




of religion, Cohen expresses that view of history's role in a critical philosophy even more 
emphatically than he had in earlier his writings. Further, he develops the underlying reasoning to 
explain that view in two different ways: once in his logic, and again, in a different way, in his 
ethics and philosophy of religion.  
Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge is concerned centrally with what he calls “pure 
knowledge”, that is, knowledge that is generated by pure thinking, which in turn is thinking that 
“may have no origin outside of itself” (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 13).26 At the very least, for Cohen 
pure thinking and pure knowledge are not ultimately justified by appeal to sensible intuition, 
which has its origin outside of pure thinking. Rather, in the context of natural science, Cohen 
says the “specific expression” of pure knowledge is law (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 259). These laws 
constitute experience for Cohen, experience that pure knowledge must retain a connection to.27 
But most importantly for our purposes, experience in Cohen’s sense is historical. He says, 
“[e]xperience indicates in the history of science, philosophy, and culture in general the problem 
which is directed at the sovereignty of theory” (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 401). That is, the critical 
philosopher’s account of pure knowledge must be constructed from an investigation of the 
history of science, philosophy, and culture, because it is in that history that the philosopher finds 
the laws that are the “specific expression” of pure knowledge. 
No less than in his earlier writings, Cohen embeds this view of the role of history in a 
critical account of knowledge in a larger, teleological view of history. In the last section, we saw 
two commitments at the center of that view of history: first, for Cohen law is what grounds 
 
26 I do not mean to suggest that Cohen’s definition of “purity” is perfectly transparent. See Holhzey (1986: 175-8), 
Poma (1997: 80-3), Edel (2010: 392-401), and Beiser (2018: 196-8) for discussion. 
 





knowledge of nature and makes it objective; and second, a complete system of those laws -- thus 
a complete account of all experience -- is an infinite task. Cohen affirms both of these 
commitments in his Logic, but does so in a way that reflects broader developments in his views. 
In the Logic, in contrast with his earlier Kant books, Cohen no longer defends his own views as 
interpretations of Kant.28 Consequently, when Cohen offers his teleological view of history in his 
Logic, he strips the view of any essential connection to Kant’s thing in itself.  
We have already seen that Cohen calls law, in the sense of the laws that constitute the 
foundation of mathematical natural science, the “specific expression” of pure knowledge. 
Echoing his views from Kant’s Theory of Experience and Kant’s Foundations of Ethics, he says 
that the object is an “abbreviation” for law (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 339). That is, law is what 
grounds the objectivity of knowledge. But further, for Cohen the complete system of these laws 
is a regulative ideal, an infinite task. Thus for example, in the context of considering how 
thinking both contains a multiplicity and is unified (and, to be sure, is unified by law), Cohen 
insists that the unification of multiplicity and unity is not some result that can be achieved 
conclusively. It is a task that never comes to an end (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 62-4). Likewise, the 
complete system of laws -- that is, the complete system of pure knowledge, or what Cohen calls 
the system of truth -- is the end of all knowledge: “we know the highest end of cognitions 
[Erkenntnisse] in the system of truth” (Cohen 1914 [1902]: 397).  
As in Cohen’s earlier writing, he is committed to all of the resources needed to explain 
why historical investigation is required for the philosopher to identify the laws that ground 
knowledge’s objectivity. Only by tracing the development of those laws over the history of 
 




science can we identify laws that remain stable across multiple changes in theory, where each 
new theory succeeds across ever-increasing domains of experience.  
Finally, we need to see how Cohen adapts the underlying reasoning of this view to fit the 
needs of his mature ethics and philosophy of religion. 
 In his Ethics of Pure Will (1904), Cohen argues that the highest ethical ideal is the idea of 
God. On his view, the idea of God is the idea of truth (Cohen 1904: 421). But more specifically, 
the content of the idea of God is the unification of nature and morality, of the domains of laws of 
nature and laws of ethics. On Cohen’s view, ethical ideas set an infinite task: that is, those ideals 
can be achieved only in an infinitely distant future. But that ideal requires nature to be “eternal,” 
that is, to exist for the infinite duration of time over which moral progress must take place 
(Cohen 1904: 428). Thus for Cohen, the history of humanity’s moral progress, no less than the 
history of science, has a teleological structure insofar as it ought to unfold towards an ideal it will 
never reach. 
 To be sure, for Cohen the idea of God and the complete system of ethical laws that 
humanity strives to realize are timelessly, universally valid ideas. For Cohen, they are 
expressions of reason. Nevertheless, he thinks moral and political history is what provides the 
evidence that humanity is in fact making progress towards those timelessly valid ideals.29 
Further, as Cohen makes especially clear in his Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism 
(1919), the content of those timelessly valid ideas is first revealed to the philosopher by 
investigating the history of religion. The opening sections of Cohen’s Religion are devoted in 
part to establishing just this methodological point: religion is the source of the ethical ideas of 
God and a complete system of ethical laws; but “[o]ne denies the possibility of knowing what 
 




religion is if its substantive content is not uncovered out of its historical development” (Cohen 
1972 [1919]: 1).30 That is, the content of religious ideas, and so too the ethical ideas of God and a 
complete system of ethical laws, must first be “uncovered” from their “historical development.” 
Thus Cohen insists that history is required to play a role in philosophy, and that its role is to first 
reveal the content of timelessly valid ideas.  
 Cohen goes further in his Religion: he gives an explanation for why historical 
investigation is required to reveal the content of timelessly valid ethical ideas, and why it is 
required to justify a philosophical account of those ideas. The explanation starts with the 
observation that different peoples’ ideas of religion, at different points in history, are incomplete. 
The expressions of ethical concepts contained in those ideas of religion fall short of universality. 
Nevertheless, he insists, all ideas of religion contribute something to the idea of a religion of 
reason (Cohen 1972 [1919]: 7). Further, as particular peoples make ethical progress, they will 
tend to leave behind their ethical concepts that most fall short of universality, and will affirm the 
ethical concepts that better approximate universality. But then, by tracing the development of a 
people’s ethical concepts through history, the philosopher can attend to which of that people’s 
ethical concepts survives through that development, and thus which of their ethical concepts is 
most likely to be a part of a complete system of universal ethical laws. That is, for Cohen, by 
tracing the development of the idea of religion and the ethical concepts derived from religion, the 
philosopher makes visible “the universality, which, in spite of all social obstructions and despite 
all shortcomings, is able to wrestle its way into the history of a particular people” (Cohen 1972 
[1919]: 8). 
 
30 I quote from Simon Kaplan’s translation of Cohen’s Religion. Also note Cohen’s insistence, echoing Frankel and 
Graetz, that the concept of Judaism can be determined only by recovering it from Judaism’s history (Cohen 1972 




 To be sure, this account of why historical investigation is required to identify timelessly 
valid laws is different than the one we saw in Cohen’s logic and, before that, his account of 
things in themselves. The account in Cohen’s ethics and religion appeals to laws whose validity 
does not ultimately depend on their explaining or grounding experience. As we saw in §5 that is 
the sense in which ethics outstrips experience for Cohen. In contrast, Cohen’s explanation for 
why historical investigation is required to identify the timelessly valid formal conditions of 
experience appeals precisely to laws that ground experience and thereby make it objective.  
 Nevertheless, the close analogy between the two accounts is unmistakable. Both 
explanations, in Cohen’s theoretical philosophy and in his ethics and religion, depend on a 
teleological conception of history. Both depend on seeing in history a progressive unfolding in 
the direction of laws of ever-increasing universality. Both claim that attending to that history is 
required for the philosopher to identify plausible candidates for laws that could be part of a 
complete system of laws that were fully universal. 
 Thus in Cohen’s mature writings, as in his earlier Kant’s Foundations of Ethics and 
Kant’s Theory of Experience, he has the resources to provide an explanation for why historical 
investigation is required to reveal the formal conditions of experience, and to justify a 
philosophical account of them.  
 
§8. Conclusion 
Time to sum up. I have argued for two claims about Cohen’s conception of philosophical 
method during the late-1870s and 1880s.  
First, Cohen maintains that historical investigation is required to reveal the formal 




are. He maintains this, even though he conceives of those formal conditions as timelessly valid. 
As we noted at the outset, this is not obviously how Kant himself thought of his philosophical 
method in the first Critique.  
Second, I have argued that, starting at least in the late-1870s, Cohen has the resources to 
explain why history plays this role in his critical philosophy. The underlying reasoning of 
Cohen’s explanation is the result of how he combines views he was exposed to in the thought of 
various of his teachers.  
The first of those views is the teleological conception of history that Frankel, Graetz, 
Trendelenburg, and Steinthal all affirm, and that Cohen echoes. But also, in Cohen’s 
interpretation of the thing in itself (and, later in his Logic, in his account of the laws that 
constitute pure knowledge) he further echoes Frankel, Graetz, and Trendelenburg in maintaining 
that history unfolds progressively towards the complete articulation of timelessly valid ideas, 
which in Cohen’s case are the formal conditions of experience.  
Cohen combines that view with one we saw in Steinthal (and the younger Cohen): 
namely, the view that knowledge’s progress through history is characterized by concepts 
developing in the direction of ever-increasing universality.  
In Cohen’s hands, the resulting view explains why historical investigation is required to 
first reveal the formal conditions of experience, and why it is required to justify a philosophical 
account of them. The view’s underlying reasoning is this. Mathematical natural science aims to 
establish laws and principles that ground ever-increasing domains of experience. It thus aims to 
establish laws of ever-increasing universality. But then, by tracing the development of a 
succession of theories through the history of science, the critical philosopher can identify laws 




formal conditions of experience. History thus provides the evidence the critical philosopher 
needs to identify the formal conditions of experience.  
 The underlying reasoning of Cohen’s view remains intact in his later writings, even while 
he strips it of any important connection to Kant’s doctrine of things in themselves. In fact, if we 
traced the development of Cohen’s views beyond his own writing and into the writing of his 
students and disciples, we would find the underlying reasoning of his view doing important work 
for the likes of Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer. However, a more detailed consideration of these 
ideas in Cohen’s mature writings, and any consideration at all of how Natorp and Cassirer were 







       
Adelmann, Dieter. “Reinige dein Denken”: Über den jüdischen Hintergrund der Philosophie 
von Hermann Cohen, ed. Görge K. Hasselhoff (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010). 
 
Baumann, Charlotte. “Hermann Cohen on Kant, Sensations, and Nature in Science,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 57:4 (2019): 647-674. 
       
Beiser, Frederick C. Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
       
Beiser, Frederick C. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796-1880 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
       
Beiser, Frederick C. Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Autobiography. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. 1868.“Mythologische Vorstellungen von Gott und Seele, psychologisch 
entwickelt.” Pt. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 1:396–434. 
 
Cohen, Hermann. “Zur Controverse zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer,” Schriften zur 
Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Vol 1 (Berlin: Akademie, 1928 [1871]). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Berlin: Dümmler, 1871/1885). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Kants Begründung der Ethik. (Berlin: Dümmler, 1877). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik (Marburg: Elwertsche, 1878 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode and seine Geschichte: Ein Kapitel 
zur Grundlegung der Erkenntniskritik (Berlin: Dümmler, 1883). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Kants Begründung der Aesthetik (Berlin: Dümmler, 1889). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. System der Philosophie, Erster Teil: Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (Berlin: 
Bruno Cassirer, 1902/1914). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. System der Philosophie, Zweiter Teil: Ethik der reinen Willens (Berlin: Bruno 
Cassirer, 1904/1907). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. Simon Kaplan. (New 
York: Frederick Ungar, 1972). 
 
Cohen, Hermann. “Zur Jahrhundertfeier unseres Graetz,” Jüdische Schriften, ed. B. Strauss. 





Deuber-Mankowsky, Astrid. Der frühe Walter Benjamin und Hermann Cohen: Jüdische Werte, 
Kritische Philosophie, vergängliche Erfahrung (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 1999). 
 
Damböck, Christian. Deutscher Empirismus: Studien zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen 
Raum 1830-1930 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2017). 
 
Edel, Geert. Von Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik, second edition (Waldkirch: Gorz, 2010). 
 
Edgar, Scott. “Review of Christian Damböck, Deutscher Empirismus: Studien Zur Philosophie 
im deutschsprachigen Raum 1830-1930,” The Vienna Circle in Czechoslovakia, Vienna Circle 
Yearbook, edited by Radek Schuster (Cham: Springer, 2020a): 185-190. 
 
Edgar, Scott. “Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of Hermann Cohen’s Antipsychologism,” 
HOPOS 10:1 (2020b): 254-273. 
 
Edgar, Scott. “Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method: A Defense,” HOPOS 
10:2 (2020c): 440-470. 
 
Fiorato, Pierfranscensco. Geschichtliche Ewigkeit. Ursprung und Zeitlichkeit in der Philosophie 
Hermann Cohens (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993). 
   
Frankel, Zacharias. “Über manches Polizeiliche des talmudischen Rechts,” Monatsschrift für 
Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 1 (1852), No. 7: 243-261. 
       
Frankel, Zacharias. “Galerie jüdischer Reisebeschreiber,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und 
Wissenschaft des Judentums, 1 (1852) No. 14: 125-142. 
       
Frankel, Zacharias. “Juden und Judenthum nach römischer Anschauung,” Monatsschrift für 
Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 9 (1860), No. 4: 125-142. 
 
Graetz, Heinrich. “The Structure of Jewish History,” The Structure of Jewish HIstory and Other 
Essays, translated and edited by Ismar Schorsch (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America, 1975 [1946]). 
 
Holzhey, Helmut. Cohen und Natorp (2 vols). (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 1986). 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason, trans & ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
Kühn, Manfred. “Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians,” Neo-
Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009): 113-131. 
 






Lazarus, Moritz, and Heymann Steinthal. “Einleitende Gedanken über Völkerpsychologie, als 
Einladung zu einer Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.” Zeitschrift für 
Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft vol. 1 (1860):1–73. 
 
Luft, Sebastian. The Space of Culture: Towards a Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Culture (Cohen, 
Natorp, and Cassirer) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
      
Mercer, Christia. “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 57 (2019), No. 3: 529-548. 
       
Pasternak, Boris. Safe Conduct: An Autobiography and Other Writings (New York: New 
Directions Publishing, 1949 [1931]). 
       
Poma, Andrea. The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, trans. John Denton (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1997). 
 
Renz, Ursula. Die Rationalität der Kultur: zur Kulturphilosophie und ihrer transzentalen 
Begründung bei, Cohen, Natorp, und Cassirer. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2002). 
      
Renz, Ursula. “Zwischen erkenntnistheoretischem Rationalismus und 
wissenschaftsphilosophischem Empirismus. Zu Cohens Philosophiebegriff,” Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft bei Hermann Cohen, ed. Christian Damböck (Cham: Springer, 2018). 
       
de Schmidt, Winrich. Pychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie: Zur Psychologie-Rezeption 
bei Hermann Cohen und Paul Natorp (Bonn: Herbert Grudmann, 1976). 
       
Schorsch, Ismar. From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism (Boston, MA: 
Brandeis University Press, 2003). 
 
Steinthal, Heymann. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Greichen und Römern mit 
besondere Ruücksicht aif die Logik. (Berlin: Dümmler, 1863). 
       
Steinthal, Heymann. Philologie, Geschichte, und Psychologie in ihren gegenseitigen 
Beziehungen (Berlin: Dümmler, 1864). 
       
Steinthal, Heymann. Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft (Berlin: Dümmler, 1871). 
 
Trendelenburg, Adolf. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. (Berlin: Bethge, 1846).  
 
Trendelenburg, Adolf. Logische Untersuchungen (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1862). 
 
Trendelenburg, Adolf. Outlines of Logic, translated by R. Broughton. (London: Shrimpton and 
Son, 1898 [1836]). 
 






Wiedebach, Hartwig. “Stufen zu einer religiösen Metaphorik der ‘andere’ Cohen in Skizzen 
eines Editors,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (2011): 295–310. 
 
Zank, Michael. The Idea of Atonement in the Philosophy of Hermann Cohen. (Providence, RI: 
Brown Judaic Studies, 2000).  
